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Young children, gender, and the heterosexual matrix 
Abstract 
In this paper I consider the adult focus of current mainstream gender theory. I relate 
this to how the concept of the heterosexual matrix originates in a social contract 
which excludes children from civil society. I argue that this exclusion is problematic 
both for theoretical reasons and from the perspective of children themselves. I start by 
discussing the nature of the heterosexual matrix and its foundations. I consider the 
implications for participation which arise from being named as a child, how that 
affects children’s attempts to claim participation in civil society, and how this is 
related to children’s naming of themselves as gendered. I then briefly consider the 
possibility that, because of their exclusion, children might also be considered to be 
exempt from the heterosexual matrix. However, I argue, there is considerable 
evidence that children are actively sexual beings who also work hard to claim 
inclusion in local practices of heterosexuality. I end by suggesting that there are three 
key reasons for this: that the discourses of normative sexuality provide children with a 
language to express sexual feelings; that self-insertion in the heterosexual matrix is a 
way for children to claim rights to participation; and that taking up heterosexual 
formations is a means whereby children can experience the power of naming 
themselves as part of the social world. 
 
Keywords: gender; Butler; Wittig; social contract; heterosexual matrix; young 
children 
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Young children, gender, and the heterosexual matrix 
 
Introduction 
In this paper I examine the relationship between the social contract as historically 
understood in the philosophical writings of the global North, and Butler’s (1990) 
conceptualisation of the heterosexual matrix, based as it is on Wittig’s (1980/1992, 
1989/1992) discussion of the social contract as inherently heterosexual. I then apply 
this to an examination of young children and their attempts to demonstrate and enact 
their right to participate in the social world. I am concerned with the relationship 
between the gendering of young children and their positioning in relation to civil 
society and the social contract; I examine the relationship between what it is to be 
named as a child (Bourdieu, 1991) and what it means to be named, and to name 
oneself, as having a gender, particularly through young children’s constructions of 
self within the heterosexual matrix. It is well established that children in early years 
classrooms in particular are heavily invested in heterosexually-inflected gendered 
identities (Blaise, 2005; Browne, 2004; Davies, 1989, 2003; Francis, 1998; Lloyd & 
Duveen, 1992; Martin, 2011; Paechter, 2007; Skelton, 2001; Walkerdine & The Girls 
and Mathematics Unit, 1989). In this paper I explore how these operate in relation to a 
hegemonically heterosexual social contract, and clarify some of the relationships 
between young children, civil society, and their embracing of conventional 
heterosexual formations. 
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Specifically, I examine the relationship between children, dominant Western 
conceptions of civil society, and the heterosexual matrix. I argue that traditional 
Western conceptions of the social contract, as a compact between adults, are so bound 
up with the idea of the heterosexual matrix that it becomes problematic to apply the 
latter unquestioningly to children. However, gender researchers whose focus is young 
children, including myself, have found the heterosexual matrix to be a useful concept 
for analysing children’s behaviour, and have generally ignored the inconsistencies 
implied by so doing. Furthermore, children themselves, especially those who, by 
virtue of their young age, find it hard to insert themselves legitimately into civil 
society, are active in taking up positions within the heterosexual matrix, and invoking 
its forms to enact scenarios and describe their activities. 
In this paper I draw out and examine these hitherto unacknowledged 
contradictions. I start by discussing the nature of the heterosexual matrix and how it is 
founded on a particular conception of the social contract that has historically been 
dominant in the global North. From this I  turn to the question of what it means to be 
named as a child, and how that affects children’s attempts to claim participation in 
civil society. I then briefly consider the possibility that young children, because of 
their exclusion, might also be considered to be exempt from the constraints and 
requirements of the heterosexual matrix. This leads to a section in which I examine 
the evidence that young children are not only actively sexual beings, but also work 
hard to claim inclusion in local practices which exemplify their understandings of 
heterosexuality. This evidence brings us to the question of why children are so eager 
for this overt insertion. I suggest that there are three key elements underpinning this: 
that the heterosexual matrix, through the discourses of normative heterosexuality, 
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provides young children  with a language with which to express sexual feelings; that 
self-insertion into the heterosexual matrix is a way for children to claim agency as 
active citizens; and that invoking the heterosexual matrix is a means whereby children 
are able to experience the power of naming themselves as part of the social world. I 
conclude with some brief reflections on how the ideas discussed in this paper can 
show us ways forward in feminist critiques of and struggles against the heterosexual 
matrix, through finding ways in which young children can be enabled to feel powerful 
through other means. 
It is important to challenge the heterosexual matrix in this way, because it is 
initially presented (Butler, 1990), and subsequently treated, as a universal. It is, 
however, founded in taken-for-granted assumptions, both about adulthood and about 
the nature of society, which originate in what Connell(2011, 2014) refers to as ‘the 
metropole’. Indeed, Connell (2011: 288) suggests that  
much of current sociological thought is based on a great fantasy – 
that the world of the metropole is all there is, or all that matters, so 
that theories developed from the social experience of the metropole 
are all that sociology needs. 
Furthermore, discussions within mainstream gender theory have ignored research, 
mainly conducted in the field of gender and education, that takes into account of 
children’s bodies and sexualities, and so have ignored some of the crucially important 
issues I raise here (R. W. Connell, 2010). While I share the view of other researchers 
that the heterosexual matrix is a useful analytical tool for understanding children’s 
identity constructions and behaviours, it is essential at the same time to be aware of 
the wider citizenship claims with which these are enmeshed. We also need to 
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understand that the Western status quo, in which children are largely ignored as 
participants in social life, is a product of a taken-for-granted affluence sufficient to 
exclude children from economic participation (Connolly, 2004; Prout, 2005).  
Heterosexuality and the social contract 
Butler (1990) argues that gender is constructed through a ‘heterosexual 
matrix’, in which gender and sexuality are inextricably linked. She defines her use of 
the term as being 
to designate that grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, 
genders, and desires are naturalized. I am drawing from Monique 
Wittig’s notion of the “heterosexual contract” and, to a lesser extent, 
on Adrienne Rich’s notion of “compulsory heterosexuality” to 
characterise a hegemonic discursive/epistemic model of gender 
intelligibility that assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense 
there must be a stable sex expressed through a stable gender 
(masculine expresses male, feminine expresses female) that is 
oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory 
practice of heterosexuality (Butler, 1990: 151) 
I have quoted Butler at length for two reasons. First, it is important to start with a 
clear definition of how the term ‘heterosexual matrix’ is being used here. Second, this 
extended quotation points clearly to Butler’s sources for this influential concept, and 
in particular to Wittig’s understanding of the social contract as inherently 
heterosexual. While much of my early discussion will refer more directly to Wittig 
than to Butler, my later exploration will principally focus on the latter, and on the 
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heterosexual matrix itself, due to the greater influence of her work on studies of 
gender and childhood. What may appear to be slippage in this respect is, however, 
deliberate, and, indeed, necessary, due to the way that Butler’s work is undergirded by 
Wittig’s understanding that heterosexuality is inherent in dominant Northern 
conceptions of civil society. 
Wittig (1989/1992) sees the social contract, originating conceptually in the 
work of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, and understood as an unspoken agreement 
between individuals and the social order, as the underpinning structure of civil 
society. Rousseau, she argues, treats the social contract as ‘the sum of fundamental 
conventions’ (p.  38) which are implied by living in society. Central to Wittig’s 
argument is that the social contract is heterosexual. She argues that the assumption of 
heterosexuality is so fundamental to society that the social contract is, in effect, a 
heterosexual contract: 
Being tied together by a social link, we can consider that each and 
every one of us stands within the social contract – the social contract 
being then the fact of having come together, of being together, of 
living as social beings. This notion is relevant for the philosophical 
mind...through the established fact that we live, function, talk, work, 
marry together. Indeed, the conventions and the language show on a 
dotted line the bulk of the social contract – which consists in living in 
heterosexuality. For to live in society is to live in heterosexuality. 
(Wittig, 1989/1992 p. 40) 
This idea that to live in society entails living in heterosexuality develops an idea from 
an earlier essay in which Wittig argues that the discourses emanating from ‘the 
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straight mind’ function to eliminate non-heterosexuals: ‘you-will-be-straight-or-you-
will-not-be’ (Wittig, 1980/1992: 28). This foreshadows even more closely Butler’s 
(1990) conception of the hegemonic heterosexual matrix. To stand outside of 
heterosexuality, is, on such a formulation, to repudiate or exclude oneself from the 
social contract; equally, by stepping outside of the social contract one is at the same 
time enabled to remove oneself from the heterosexual matrix.   
Both Wittig and Butler are interested in examining the heterosexual nature of 
the social contract in relation to the oppression of adult women (and, for Butler, 
people who are not normatively gendered) within a hegemonically heterosexual 
society (Butler, 1993, 2004). Their purpose is to work towards freeing individuals and 
groups from such formations, so that they are better able to have ‘liveable lives’, for 
which ‘categories of recognition exist’ (Butler, 2004: 8). Butler’s concept of the 
heterosexual matrix, and, by extension, Wittig’s idea that the social contract is 
constructed as heterosexual, however, have also been used as tools for analysis of 
particular social situations and formations. Thus, within contemporary feminism, ‘the 
heterosexual matrix’ has become a taken-for-granted idea within which we can 
analyse the behaviour of individuals and groups, without, necessarily, making much 
headway in working for change. Atkinson and DePalma (2009: 18), indeed, argue that 
‘through naming and believing the heterosexual matrix and identifying evidence of its 
operation, we reify, reinforce and reinscribe it, even as we attempt to subvert, unsettle 
or deconstruct it’. With this in mind, my intention in this paper is to unpick the 
implications of using something formulated in terms of a social contract for analysing 
the behaviour and social relations of children, and to call into question the application 
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of such a concept to children without a full recognition of the implications of so 
doing.    
Of course, the way in which Wittig writes about the social contract and the 
ways in which earlier Western philosophers do are not entirely the same. Wittig’s 
predecessors in this work focus on the social contract as the underpinning of civil 
society, of the public world, and are concerned to establish ways in which such a 
public compact, and its result, the state in one form or another, relates to and bears 
down on individuals (Locke, 1690, 1952). This seems to lay the focus on the contract: 
a tacit acknowledgement, through taking part in public affairs, that one is bound by 
both its unwritten and written strictures. Wittig, on the other hand, by focusing on the 
way that language underpins the whole of the social, puts the emphasis on the 
communicative nature of social life. Wittig’s conception of the social contract is, 
therefore, in some sense prior to those of the more politically-focused philosophers: 
their social contracts are unable to function at all without Wittig’s. Consequently, 
although the conceptions are somewhat different, it is reasonable to assume that 
Wittig’s assertion that the social contract is always heterosexual should also apply to 
the social contract as more conventionally understood, that which is involved in 
participation in civil society. This leads, however, to the questions: who exactly, is 
part of, and subject to, the social contract; and how is such participation, or exclusion, 
related to the heterosexual matrix? If civil society is founded on an assumption of 
heterosexuality, formed between people within the heterosexual matrix, what does 
that mean for those people whom we treat as not fully part of civil society? 
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Being named as a child 
The social contract, however conceptualised in detail, has generally been understood 
as a compact between adults (Prout, 2005; Thomas, 2012), and, indeed, for the earlier 
philosophers, between adult males (Cohen, 2005). This reflects the formal exclusion 
of women from civil society in these periods, due to their perceived inability to 
transcend the body and participate in rationally-focused public life (Gatens, 1991; 
Hekman, 1990; Lister, 2007; Young, 1990). The philosophical, if not actual, 
subsumation of women and children in the civil participation of men, persisted until 
relatively recently. Rawls (1972), for example, who was concerned to establish how 
we might decide what would constitute a just approach to society, conceived of a 
thought experiment in which heads of households – a patriarchally charged 
formulation used as a defence against intergenerational rivalry – would decide, in a 
situation of ignorance about their own positioning, what would be the fairest way of 
doing things. More commonsense approaches to the question of who is a full 
participant in civil society also focus on adults(Larkins, 2014; Lister, 2007), or at least 
on those who are conceived as having an adult, or near-adult, understanding of the 
world.  
Bourdieu (1991) argues that the social world involves a constant and repeated 
performance of categorisation, of naming. Such performative naming assigns 
individuals and groups to particular positions within society, and is consequently 
extremely powerful: 
It is easy to understand why one of the elementary forms of political 
power should have consisted, in many archaic societies, in the almost 
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magical power of naming and bringing into existence by virtue of 
naming. (Bourdieu, 1991: 236) 
Bourdieu is concerned with the ways in which such naming brings into existence, 
controls and subordinates particular social class groups. What I am interested in here, 
however, is what it means to be named as a child within civil society, and the 
relationship between one named as a child and the social contract. 
One way to approach this is to look at where children stand in relation to the 
law. The law works in both directions here: it excludes those named as children from 
rights and privileges, as well as responsibilities, accorded to adults, while at the same 
time also providing protection for those considered to be vulnerable on the basis of 
their child status (Cohen, 2005). Laws are not entirely consistent, however. For 
example, English law considers children to be criminally responsible from the age of 
10, though they are usually tried in child courts until they are 18. They are considered 
unable to give any form of consent to sex, even consensual sex with a child of the 
same age, before the age of 13, and those under 16 having sex with those older than 
that age are also regarded as being non-consenting. English law, therefore, like that of 
many states, names an individual as a child in some situations and not others, 
depending on age and, in some cases, on the child’s perceived maturity. This latter 
criterion is particularly clear with regard to the question of ‘Gillick competency’, 
which relates specifically to the rights of girls under 16 to obtain contraceptive advice 
without parental knowledge or consent. A young woman is regarded as ‘Gillick 
competent’ if she is judged both to be able to understand the nature of the advice 
which is being given, and to have sufficient maturity to understand what is involved 
(NSPCC, 2015). 
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In such cases, naming a person as a child both protects them (from the full 
force of the law; from sexual exploitation) and restricts their rights to take part in 
certain activities, depending on age and perceived maturity. In both these respects, 
naming a person as a child takes them, partially at least, outside of the social contract, 
because they are considered to have neither the rights nor the responsibilities 
associated with full inclusion (Cohen, 2005). With regard to formal forms of child 
protection, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), all those 
under the age of 18 are named as children in this way, though the framing of their 
subordination in terms of ‘rights’ complicates and in some ways obscures the political 
implications of such positioning. Frijhoff (2012) argues that this keeps children 
confined in their childhood, while Gabriel (2014) suggests that children are 
constructed by adults as being of a different generation. Through this, adults ‘use their 
positions of power to define differences between adults and children’ (123). 
The CRC also makes provision for the child’s voice to be heard in decisions 
that affect him or her. This simultaneously positions the child as a citizen who has a 
right to have and express opinions and have these taken seriously, and as someone 
who does not have full citizenship rights. For example, while the best interests of the 
child are considered to be the most important priority in decisions regarding children, 
it is not clear who are considered the most appropriate people to judge what these are 
(Rodham, 1973): for example, the CRC protects the rights of parents to share 
responsibility for bringing up a child and to guide and advise them. Children are also 
explicitly protected from work that is dangerous or which might harm their health or 
education, and (under the age of 15) from taking part as combatants in war. So while 
the CRC takes seriously the idea that children’s voices, opinions and wishes are 
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important, it also maintains the right for named and unnamed adults, including 
national governments, to override these. Furthermore, by providing for a child’s 
education and personal development, the CRC treats children not as full citizens, but 
as citizens-in-formation (Buckley, 2014; Larkins, 2014), requiring that they be 
afforded the opportunities they need to develop into full citizens when they are older. 
The extent to which children are regarded as full or almost-full members of 
the body politic, and therefore participants in the social contract, varies both with age 
and with competence. Stoeklin (2013) argues that, however children’s rights are 
conceived, the child remains an actor with limited agency. He points out that in order 
for a child to be eligible for Article 12 of the CRC, under which children have the 
right to express their views and have them taken seriously, a child has to be seen as 
competent, but such competence is something that is socially defined and recognised. 
Being recognised as competent is something that happens in different ways in 
different situations (Frijhoff, 2012; Iverson, 2014; Wyness, 2012), but age remains a 
factor in such recognition. The younger the child is, the less likely he or she is to be 
treated, and thereby implicitly recognised, as a full citizen.  
The implication of this partial citizenship is that children, particularly young 
children, are not generally considered to be participants in the social contract, as 
traditionally conceived. This leaves us with the question of how that affects their 
positioning with regard to the heterosexual matrix. In considering this question I am 
going to focus on very young children, in order to simplify the discussion. With older 
children and teenagers there is evidence of recognition of some citizenship rights, 
some of which (such as the notion of Gillick competence) are explicitly related to 
heterosexually-focused conceptions of what it means to be a full participant in civil 
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society, able to come to and enact one’s own decisions. Generally, however, such 
notions of competence are not applied to children under six. The remainder of my 
paper, therefore, will focus on these very young children, and on their contradictory 
relationship both to the social contract, as adults-in-the-making, and to the 
heterosexual matrix. 
Young children and the heterosexual matrix 
I have established that the heterosexual matrix is implicated in wider conceptions of 
the social contract, and in the exclusion of young children from full participation in 
this. Such a position suggests that it might be possible for young children to stand 
outside of the heterosexual matrix, to be insulated from the level of involvement that 
is so hard for adults to escape. It could be that children’s bodies, rather than having to 
be intelligible primarily as gendered, could instead gain their intelligibility from their 
status specifically as the bodies of children, with this happening prior to a sexualised 
conception of gender. The everyday social world has, at least since the nineteenth 
century (Prout, 2005) treated children in this way much of the time: they are seen as 
pre-sexual beings who need to be protected from sexualisation (Cullen & Sandy, 
2009; Epstein, 1999; King, 2009; Renold, 2006; Ryan, 2000). In the affluent North 
they are frequently the subject of moral panics in this respect (Robinson, 2008), while 
in less privileged parts of the world this can expose girls, in particular, to danger 
(Bhana, 2005).  
Those carrying out research into gender, sexuality and childhood, however, 
have produced abundant evidence both that young children are anything but pre-
sexual, and that they work hard to insert themselves into heterosexual discourses and 
 
 
15 
performances. This evidence suggests that it is unrealistic simply to position young 
children outside of the heterosexual matrix. Ryan (2000), for example, reviewing the 
literature up until 1988, reported retrospective survey data showing that adults 
remember sexual experiences with other children from age four, mainly in the context 
of fantasy play, such as ‘playing married’ or ‘playing doctor’. Such play frequently 
took place out of the sight and without the knowledge of adults, suggesting that 
studies relying on adult observation are likely to under-report such behaviour. 
Nevertheless, research carried out with adult carers has found that young children 
engage in a variety of sexual practices. Pre-school children have been observed in 
numerous studies to engage in masturbatory behaviour, including: 
 arousal patterns, orgasmic tension reduction, aspects of the child’s 
demeanour which suggested introspection (mental imagery) and 
behavioral patterns suggesting that children’s masturbatory activities 
were at times self soothing and tension reducing (while bored or 
stressed) and at other times stimulating and exciting (when bored or 
happy). (Ryan, 2000: 36) 
Friedrich et al (1998), note that ‘day care providers reported that a majority of 4- to 6-
year-olds interacted spontaneously, at least occasionally, in sexual ways’ (p. 2). Their 
own questionnaire study of female primary carers found that ‘2-year-old children are 
observed to be relatively sexual (compared with 10- to 12-year-olds) and children 
become increasingly sexual up to age 5’ (p. 5). Items with an affirmative response of 
over 20% for both boys and girls aged 2-5 years old include: stands too close; touches 
[mother’s or other women’s] breasts; touches sex parts at home; and tries to look at 
people when they are nude. They conclude that: 
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These items can be considered as developmentally-related sexual 
behaviors, meaning that they were observed in a significant percentage 
of children for that age and gender group. (Friedrich et al., 1998: 8) 
It can thus be seen that even very young children, while not having the sexual focus or 
response of older children, adolescents or adults, do nevertheless have and express 
sexual feelings and engage in sexual play and exploration of one kind or another. It is 
worth noting that when such behaviour is observed to take place between children, it 
can be differently interpreted and regulated according to the gender of the children 
involved. For example, Woodward (2003), in an ethnographic study of a nursery 
class, noted that ‘amorous’ (p. 180) behaviour (kissing and/or cuddling) between 
girls, or between girl/boy pairs, was ignored, but visibly disapproved of when it took 
place between two boys.  
Not only are young children sexual, evidence from a range of studies suggests 
that they are also heavily invested in the heterosexual matrix. Young children’s play 
reflects and reinforces heterosexual norms, and both boys and girls are active in 
inserting themselves into heterosexual social relations. This insertion takes place 
through the forms, foci and execution of play activities, and through the claiming and 
enactment of gendered power relations within early years settings. There is a myriad 
of research evidence about this; I will focus on a few examples. 
Martin’s (2011) ethnographic study of an English nursery school shows 
numerous examples of children explicitly positioning themselves within heterosexual 
masculinities and femininities. Girls drew pictures of themselves in fashionable 
clothes, wearing makeup, including lipstick and exaggerated eyelashes, and with big 
hairdos. They portrayed themselves in princess costumes, party and wedding dresses, 
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and talked and monitored their clothing and appearance. Boys’ self-portraits, 
similarly, inscribed them in stereotypically active masculinities, particularly through 
pictures of themselves playing football with their friends. Blaise (2005), studying five 
and six year olds, reports that girls ‘pretended to be beautiful princesses attending 
extravagant parties and balls where they would meet and dance with a handsome 
prince’ (p. 77). In some cases, boys were included in their play, as husbands or suitors 
who were taking them out, though the latter might, while superficially co-operating, 
simultaneously assert traditional masculinities through other play activities. 
Girls’ fascination with makeup and accessories is discussed by both Martin 
(2011) and Blaise (2005); in both cases children use makeup as a signifier of 
adulthood.  In describing an incident where one girl brought makeup to school for 
show-and-tell, Blaise outlines how this led to an extensive discussion between the 
girls about how and when they used makeup at home. A boy attempting to be 
involved in this discussion was first ignored, then rebuffed, and finally ridiculed. 
Blaise notes that  
this episode highlights how the discourse of makeup circulates in the 
classroom and how children use their knowledge of both the 
heterosexual matrix and makeup to maintain particular ways to be girls 
and boys. (p. 75) 
This knowledge is both strongly gendered and openly associated with adulthood. Part 
of the girls’ discussion concerns how much makeup (if any) they are allowed to use at 
home, and the difference between ‘play’ and ‘real’ makeup. Blaise comments that 
‘some of the politics the children are aware of include...the notion that it is not 
appropriate for young children to wear “real” makeup’ (p. 75). By claiming to using 
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makeup whether or not their parents approve, these young girls demonstrate both their 
understanding that young children are ‘supposed’ to be positioned outside of the 
heterosexual mores of adult society, and their resistance to such positioning. 
Several authors (Blaise, 2005; Browne, 2004; Davies, 1989; Marsh, 2000; 
Martin, 2011) have discussed the ways in which young boys are invested in superhero 
play, using it as a way of constructing heroic forms of masculinity in which weaker, 
mainly female, individuals, are rescued from dangerous situations. Marsh (2000) 
notes that the superhero discourse is mainly produced by men, for boys, and that this 
makes it harder for girls to become involved in these forms of play, though there are 
strategies that can be used to involve them. She suggests that superheroes appeal to 
young children partly in contrast to their relative powerlessness in daily life. Indeed, 
by playing a traditional superhero who saves the city, a child can imaginatively insert 
him or herself very firmly into the (imagined) body politic.  
Cullen and Sandy (2009) argue that ‘children have strong, culturally 
embedded, discursively constructed notions of themselves as gendered and sexualised 
beings from an early age’. This is played out in a variety of ways, but most frequently 
including boyfriend/girlfriend identities and positioning, which again claims 
participation in the heterosexual matrix. Although studies of this more frequently 
focus on older, though still primary-age children (Epstein, 1999; Paechter & Clark, 
2007, 2010; Renold, 2005), research on infant and nursery children has also revealed 
heterosexualised and (quasi)-romantic relationships and games between boys and 
girls. The games seem usually to involve variations on kiss-chase, in which one group 
(usually girls) chases an individual or individual from the other gender, kissing them 
once captured (Connolly, 1998; Martin, 2011; Scott, 2002). Martin notes that, while 
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boys seemed to be ambivalent towards these games, girls found them exciting. Bhana 
(2005) argues that this was also the case at the white middle-class South African 
primary school she studied, while noting also that for girls in township schools it is, 
by contrast, a form of sexual violence which they resist through other forms of 
sexualised play. 
Martin and Connolly both comment on the importance, particularly for girls, 
of fantasy play involving heterosexual relationships, including mummies and daddies; 
doctors; mummies and babies (Connolly, 1998); and fairy tales in which princesses 
were captured and then rescued by princes (Martin, 2011). Despite their eagerness to 
act out these games and tell the researcher about them, the nursery children in 
Martin’s study were keen to ensure she knew that they understood that they were ‘too 
young’ to take such relationships seriously. The American first-grade children studied 
by Scott (2002), however, were open in speaking about having boyfriends and 
girlfriends, both to the researcher and to each other, though these relationships were 
not always evident in playground play. For the British 5-6 year olds in Connolly’s 
(1998) research, heterosexual orientation and relationships, as defined through 
boyfriends and girlfriends, were a significant focus of identity construction. For both 
boys and girls, having a boyfriend or girlfriend conferred significant cultural capital 
among the peer group, although there was an ethnic dimension to this, with African-
Caribbean boys particularly prized and South Asian boys and girls particularly 
derided as romantic partners. The importance of sexual/romantic relationships as 
status markers in this setting, Connolly argues, had the effect of positioning girls as 
sexualised objects, treated as property in masculine struggles over territory. In this 
way, boys can be seen to be asserting and taking up heterosexual formations as part of 
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power plays which reflect the operation of the heterosexual matrix within wider 
society, and in particular a local context of violence in which even very young boys 
were expected to present themselves as streetwise.  
Power, pleasure, citizenship and the heterosexual matrix 
This leads us to the question: why is it so important for young children to 
insert themselves so forcefully into the heterosexual matrix? What is it that makes 
such a repressive formation so attractive to them? There are a number of possible 
answers to these questions. 
The first may be that it is partly developmental. If pre-school children have 
sexual feelings, expressed through masturbation, curiosity about adults and 
exploration with each other, then the heterosexual matrix is the most easily available 
construct within which to understand these. Young children are surrounded by 
heterosexual relationships in their own (though not necessarily immediate) families, 
in the media, and in stories (Cullen & Sandy, 2009; Davies, 1989). Children’s 
fairytale fiction, in particular, offers images of romantic heterosexual love which, 
while unrealistic in multiple ways, form part of a wider imaginary to which many 
adults, of varied sexual orientations, subscribe. Indeed, it is not unusual for 
friendships between children of different genders to be described by adults in a joking 
manner as if they were romantic relationships, referring to ‘boyfriends’ or 
‘girlfriends’ (Woodward, 2003). It would not be surprising, therefore, if young 
children, experiencing sexual feelings about other children and attempting to make 
sense of them, would latch onto the heterosexual matrix as a discourse within which 
to locate and express their feelings: it is, after all, that which is most readily available. 
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The importance of self-inscription into the heterosexual matrix among young 
children seems, however, to require a stronger and more complex explanation than 
this. We need to be able to explain, for example, why teachers wanting to ‘queer’ 
early years classrooms have to work so hard in order to do so, and why alternative 
constructions of self, sexuality and the world are not easily taken up (Blaise, 2005; 
Cullen & Sandy, 2009; Davies, 1989, 2003). It seems to me that a major factor here is 
precisely the close relationship between the heterosexual matrix and the social 
contract, and the importance for children of being part of the adult world.  
Davies (2003) argues that, for children, the adult/child binary is of crucial 
significance, alongside male/female. They see adults, she argues, as having agency 
regarding both their own lives and those of children: they therefore struggle against 
adults’ positioning of them, which names them as children and so lacking competence 
(Gabriel, 2014). Children’s striving towards agency, Davies suggests, coexists and is 
bound up with this positioning. I would go further and argue that the contradictions 
experienced by young children lead them explicitly to assert their rights within 
society through self-inscription in the heterosexual matrix.  They strive to become 
parties to the social contract by virtue of their desire to have more control over their 
lives. However, they are prevented from doing so partly because of the social 
convention that they are pre-sexual, which places them, as children, outside the 
heterosexual matrix. In this situation, positioning oneself within the heterosexual 
matrix is a way of claiming inclusion in the social contract. I also contend that this 
self-inscription is a powerful source of pleasure for young children, giving them a 
further motivation to bind themselves in this way.  
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There is considerable evidence that children desire to be part of civil society. 
Children of all ages have been found to lay importance on being kept informed 
regarding decisions about themselves (Mayall, 2007). When it comes to significant 
matters, such as domestic violence interventions (Iverson, 2014) and where and how a 
child will live after divorce (van Nijnatten & Jangen, 2011), children strive to make 
their voices heard, even in the face of opposition from adults in authority. Wyness 
(2012) points out that even for adults, the concept of an unmediated voice is 
problematic: giving weight to children’s opinions has more to do with making sure 
that they have an input into important decisions than with affording them complete 
autonomy from adults (Thomas, 2012). He also notes that, in contrast to the dominant 
voice-based model of participation, one way in which children participate in civil 
society is through economic activity, which, while excluded from the CRC as part of 
an attempt to eliminate child labour, can involve adults and children working together 
for their common good. This is particularly salient in poorer regions where children’s 
labour is essential to family finances. Ertl (2014) in a periodical article about 
Bolivia’s child and adolescent trade unions, notes that, for these children and their 
families, their work is necessary for daily living. By having it recognised through 
state regulation and union membership, Bolivian children over 10 become entitled to 
the minimum wage and gain healthcare rights as workers, as well as protected time 
for homework; they value this recognition that they are economically active citizens. 
However, even in richer countries, children value participation in economic activity. 
Gasson et al (2014), studying New Zealand children working for pay, quote statistics 
suggest that 5% of New Zealand 9 year olds do paid work, rising to 76% by age 16. 
They point out that young people feel empowered by having an involvement in 
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decision making about their working lives, and value being able to work 
independently and contribute to the family.  
It is clear, therefore, that even very young children feel that it is important to 
belong to civil society at some level. If participation in the social contract inherently 
involves, as Wittig (1989/1992) suggests, participation in dominant heterosexual 
forms, it is unsurprising that young children take up these forms as a way of 
demonstrating their rights and abilities to participate.  
Beyond, this, however, it seems to me that a major factor in children’s 
eagerness to take up and construct themselves within the heterosexual matrix is that it 
gives them pleasure; a pleasure that comes in part from the power associated with 
naming oneself not as a mere child, but as a member of the wider social world. Young 
children, positioned most of the time as lacking in social power, resist such 
positioning in many ways, including by acting out the roles of those whom they see as 
being powerful. Walkerdine et al (1989) point out that, even within a sexist society, 
women are relatively powerful in their roles as mothers. Girls engaging in fantasy 
scenarios in which they are mothers, taking control of their ‘husbands’ and ‘babies’ 
are claiming some of that power for themselves. Similarly, boys who take on 
masculine-labelled roles in play are both resisting the power of the (pretend) woman 
in the home and asserting their own symbolic positions within wider social life. As 
Blaise (2005), for example, analyses a game in which two boys ‘take out’ two girls in 
car which then gets involved in a shootout. She argues that both boys and girls claim 
power by positioning themselves as stereotypically gendered men or women, with the 
girls asserting authority inside and boys outside the home corner, and suggests that, in 
doing this,  
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All of the children are enjoying a chance to demonstrate their gender 
competence. They feel good while playing the heterosexual game. (p. 
29) 
We see this pleasure in taking on roles within the heterosexual matrix 
repeatedly in young children’s play: in dressing up as princesses; in defeating 
baddies; in talking about makeup, clothes or football; in claiming romantic 
boyfriend/girlfriend relationships. This pleasure that children gain by inserting 
themselves into the heterosexual matrix should not be underestimated. It is the 
pleasure associated with feeling powerful by acting out powerful positions; it is the 
pleasure that comes from claiming and recognising one’s future as full actors within a 
heterosexually-focused civil society; and it is the pleasure that arises from belonging, 
from inserting oneself into a heterosexually-constructed gender, shared with older 
children and with adults.  
Some concluding remarks 
If we understand the social contract in the way that Wittig does, as what we enter into 
as ‘living as social beings’ (Wittig, 1989/1992: 40), then children are indeed included, 
at least to the extent that they are considered fully social. The more focused 
understanding rooted in Western political philosophy, however, excludes very young 
children entirely as non-competent, and allows older children only the participation 
rights concomitant with adult perceptions of their ability to comprehend the import of 
decisions. This is not only the case in theory, but also becomes evident when we 
consider how adults, at least in more affluent areas of the globe, actually behave 
towards children, excluding them from economic and social participation. Children 
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themselves, however, are eager to participate in wider civil society, to understand 
what is going on in their lives, and to have their voices heard and their opinions taken 
into account. Faced with the experience of being named as children, and, as a result, 
excluded from the adult world, they have to find ways in which they can reinsert 
themselves into civil society and the social contract. 
The heterosexual matrix is a key underpinning feature of adult society, and 
this is clear to children through their experiences of everyday family life, the media, 
and the stories they encounter both at home and at school. They can see that many 
adults gain both power and pleasure from their involvement in hegemonic sexual 
practices, and they want to have both of these for themselves. Indeed, one way in 
which they understand these heterosexual practices is as a marker of adulthood: they 
are not expected of, or even permitted to, those named as children. Children’s self-
inscription in the heterosexual matrix can therefore be read as a repeated act of 
resistance to the adult naming of children as children: it is a means whereby children 
make claims to adult rights and privileges by asserting that they are, essentially, the 
same as adults.  
By taking part in heterosexualised fantasy play, children are able, if only 
fleetingly, to experience the pleasure of involvement in adult-signified power 
relations. This allows children to understand themselves as potentially, if not actually, 
powerful actors in the world, and, by so doing, to claim full membership of the social 
contract. These powerful claims reflect powerful desires. If we want to cut through 
children’s investment in the heterosexual matrix, therefore, we may need to find ways 
to make it less powerful for them. How we do this is unclear, but it is at least possible 
that it may include changing the implications of being named as a child so that 
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children, particularly young children, can make claims to be full members of the body 
politic without the necessity to invoke the heterosexual matrix. This could include: 
finding ways to involve even very young children in decisions about things that 
matter to them; recognising and valuing their participation in economic activity; and, 
of course, resisting the heterosexual matrix itself so that it becomes less thoroughly 
implicated in the adult-focused society. 
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